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There  is much  interest  in the  claim  that  dysfunction  of  the  mirror  neuron  system  in
individuals  with  autism  spectrum  condition  causes  difﬁculties  in  social  interaction  and
communication.  This  paper  systematically  reviews  all  published  studies  using  neuroscience
methods  (EEG/MEG/TMS/eyetracking/EMG/fMRI)  to examine  the  integrity  of the mirror
system in autism.  25 suitable  papers  are  reviewed.  The  review  shows  that  current  data  are
very mixed  and that  studies  using  weakly  localised  measures  of  the  integrity  of  the  mirror
system are  hard  to interpret.  The  only  well  localised  measure  of  mirror  system  function  isirror neuron system
mitation
ocial  cognition
fMRI. In fMRI  studies,  those  using  emotional  stimuli  have  reported  group  differences,  but
studies using  non-emotional  hand  action  stimuli  do  not.  Overall,  there  is  little  evidence  for
a global  dysfunction  of the  mirror  system  in autism.  Current  data  can  be  better  understood
under  an  alternative  model  in  which  social  top-down  response  modulation  is  abnormal  in
autism. The  implications  of this  model  and  future  research  directions  are discussed.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. IntroductionIndividuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC)
struggle with social interaction and communication, both
l Cognit92 A.F.d.C. Hamilton / Developmenta
in formal testing and in their everyday lives. Many differ-
ent  cognitive and brain-based theories have been proposed
to  account for these difﬁculties. Current proposals include
difﬁculties in theory of mind (Frith, 2001), in social motiva-
tion  (Chevallier et al., 2012) and in mirror neuron function
(Dapretto and Iacoboni, 2006; Gallese et al., 2009; Rizzolatti
et  al., 2009). The latter is the focus of the present paper,
where I examine the human mirror neuron system (MNS)
and  whether damage to this system might have relevance
for  autism.
The manuscript proceeds in three parts. First, I brieﬂy
describe the functions of the human mirror system and
the  different models of MNS  dysfunction which have been
proposed. Second, I systematically review the scientiﬁc lit-
erature  on the MNS  in ASC, focusing on studies which have
used  neuroscientiﬁc methods to assess the function of the
MNS.  Third, I provide an overall assessment of the ﬁeld,
and  make suggestions for future directions in terms of both
theory  and experiment.
2.  The mirror system and autism
The human mirror neuron system (MNS) can be deﬁned
as  the set of brain regions which are active both when
participants perform an action and when they observe
another person performing the same action (Rizzolatti and
Craighero,  2004). The core components of the human MNS
are  inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal lobule
(IPL).  In the macaque monkey equivalents of these regions,
single  neurons have been recorded with mirror properties
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 1996). Though single
units have not been recorded in the human MNS, detailed
patterns of activation in fMRI studies leave little doubt
that these areas contain mirror neuron populations (Kilner
et  al., 2009; Oosterhof et al., 2010). The human MNS  is
widely  assumed to play a key role in action understand-
ing and imitation, though this remains debated (Dinstein
et  al., 2008; Hickok, 2009). There are also a number of
fMRI  studies, some using emotional stimuli, which suggest
the  existence of a broader mirror neuron network (Caspers
et  al., 2010) that incorporates somatosensory and premo-
tor  cortex (Keysers et al., 2010), and possibly anterior insula
(Wicker  et al., 2003). The present paper will not consider
this extended mirror network in detail.
The dominant theory of MNS  function is based on
a  direct-matching model in which observed actions are
directly  mapped onto the observers own motor system
(Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). This framework stresses
the  idea that the MNS  encodes the goal of an action, not
just  the basic motor features, and that this direct goal
encoding provides a primary mechanism both for under-
standing other people and for imitating them. It is claimed
that  the MNS  is critical for performing and understanding
action sequences (Fogassi et al., 2005). The MNS  might also
make  a contribution to theory of mind (Gallese, 2007) or to
language  (Gallese, 2008) but these claims are more spec-
ulative. Many other models of the MNS  are possible and
may  even be more plausible (Michael, 2011), but the direct-
matching model gives the basis for most theories linking
the  MNS  to autism.ive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105
The  claim that dysfunction of the MNS  is a causal factor
in  poor social cognition in ASC is commonly called the bro-
ken  mirror theory (BMT) of autism. Here I distinguish three
variants  of the BMT  which make slightly different claims.
First,  extensive behavioural evidence of weak imitation
skills in ASC (Williams et al., 2004) combined with the puta-
tive  role of the MNS  in imitation (Buccino et al., 2004) led
to  the idea that MNS  dysfunction is the cause of poor imita-
tion  in ASC (Williams et al., 2001). The theory put forward
by  Williams explicitly links the MNS  to the self-other map-
ping  function described by Rogers and Pennington (1991)
and  suggests that failure of a basic self-other mapping in
ASC  could cause difﬁculties in both imitation and other
aspects of social cognition such as theory of mind. A similar
position is endorsed by Gallese et al. (2009), and I call this
the  imitation version of the BMT.
Second, the simulation version of the BMT  is built on
the  idea that the MNS  provides a basis for simulating other
people.  Such simulation could apply to actions, but also to
emotions  and to mental states. The simulation BMT  claims
that  a failure of a basic simulation system in the MNS in
autism  would cause very widespread difﬁculties in theory
of  mind, language and empathy (Dapretto and Iacoboni,
2006; Oberman and Ramachandran, 2007). This theory pre-
dicts  that comprehension of actions and emotions in the
broader  MNS  should all be abnormal in ASC.
Third, the chaining version of the BMT  is a more subtle
theory which only on the claim that some mirror neurons
represent action chains or sequences (Fogassi et al., 2005).
These  chaining mirror neurons are active only when the
monkey  sees or performs an action embedded in a par-
ticular sequence, for example, grasping-to-eat rather than
grasping-to-place. Activation of chaining mirror neurons
at  the beginning of a sequence could potentially allow the
monkey  to predict how the sequence will unfold, and thus
understand the intention of the actor (Fogassi et al., 2005).
Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro (2010) suggest that only these
action  chaining mirror neurons are abnormal in ASC, and
that  dysfunction of these particular neurons leads to dif-
ﬁculties  in other areas of social cognition. The chaining
version of the broken mirror theory does not make direct
claims  about language or emotion comprehension impair-
ment.
These  three versions of the BMT  share the claim that
dysfunction of the MNS  is a primary cause of poor social
interaction in individuals with ASC. This claim is intu-
itively appealing and has received widespread attention,
including in the popular press. Several studies suggest
that brain-based explanations of behaviour are considered
more convincing than psychological explanations (McCabe
and  Castel, 2008; Weisberg et al., 2008). This may  explain
why  links between a seductively named brain system (the
MNS)  and a developmental disorder are appealing. Fund-
ing  has been invested in this area and therapies based
on improving MNS  function have been proposed (Perkins
et  al., 2010; Wan  et al., 2010). However, the evidence that
the  MNS  is actually abnormal in individuals with ASC is not
always  clear.
Suitable evidence for abnormalities of the MNS  in ASC
could  come from a variety of sources, both behavioural
and brain-imaging studies. Behavioural studies are the
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ost plentiful, and many have examined imitation and
ction  comprehension in an effort to measure MNS func-
ion.  Papers have reported abnormal imitation behaviour in
hildren  and adults with ASC (reviewed in Williams et al.,
004),  with both reduced frequency of spontaneous imi-
ation  (Charman et al., 1997; Ingersoll, 2007) and reduced
mitation accuracy (Rogers et al., 1996; Vivanti et al., 2008)
bserved. These have been reviewed in detail elsewhere
Hamilton, 2008; Kana et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2001)
nd  overall provide mixed evidence for imitation difﬁcul-
ies.  In particular, performance is worse on spontaneous
mitation and imitation of non-object directed actions but
s  normal on goal-directed imitation and reaction-time
asks. A major difﬁculty in interpreting behavioural stud-
es  of imitation or action comprehension in ASC concerns
he  speciﬁcity of the result. Poor performance on an imita-
ion  could be caused by failure of the MNS, or by failure of
ther  brain systems involved in visual processing, control
f  responding or motor performance. Similarly, good per-
ormance on a particular task could indicate an intact MNS
r  could reﬂect compensatory strategies. Thus, behavioural
tudies are limited in their ability to pinpoint the under-
ying  cause of a behaviour in terms of particular brain
ystems.
This means we must turn to brain imaging studies to
roperly examine the BMT. As this theory is deﬁned in
erms  of brain systems, it is appropriate to test it with refer-
nce  to those same brain systems. Evidence in favour of the
MT  should show reduced responses in the MNS  regions
f  the brain in individuals with ASC compared to typical
ndividuals. The present paper systematically reviews pub-
ished  studies on the function of the MNS  in participants
ith ASC, with the aim of assessing the broken mirror the-
ry  of autism, and suggesting useful future directions for
utism  research.
.  Methodology of the review
Searches were conducted on Pubmed and
oogleScholar for the terms “autism”/“autism spectrum
ondition” and the terms “mirror neuron system”/“mirror
ystem”, ﬁnding papers published up to March 2012.
dditional searches located papers which cite some of the
ajor  papers on the topic (Dapretto et al., 2006; Williams
t  al., 2001). Papers were initially ﬁltered by examination
f the title/abstract to identify papers presenting original
ata  (not reviews) which used brain-based rather than
ehavioural methods to compare typical and autistic
articipants. Further detailed reading identiﬁed 25 papers
hich  directly contrast typical and autistic participants
nd measure brain responses in tasks relevant to the
irror neuron system. It is notable that this search also
ound  36 review papers on the topic of mirror neurons and
utism  have been published over the same period, which
uggests that excitement outweighs data in this area.
The  25 empirical papers were grouped according to
he  method used for studying group differences in cog-
itive  function, which include EEG, MEG, TMS  and fMRI.
o  studies using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) were
dentiﬁed. The review includes papers using eye track-
ng  and muscle activation (EMG) measures because theseive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105 93
feature  prominently in this research area. However, studies
using  general behavioural measures (e.g. imitation tasks)
were  excluded; these have largely been reviewed else-
where (Hamilton, 2008; Kana et al., 2010; Williams et al.,
2001).  Studies of reaction time during automatic imita-
tion  have also been reviewed elsewhere (Cook et al., 2012;
Wang  and Hamilton, 2012). Studies examining motor per-
formance  in ASC do not directly tap MNS  function and have
been  examined elsewhere (Fournier et al., 2010; Gowen
and  Hamilton, 2012) so they were not included here. The
ﬁnal  section of the review considers a number of other
approaches which did not ﬁt in the standard categorisation
of tasks, and also the ﬁndings from structural MRI  studies.
In  recent years, there has been an increased focus on
the  importance of using appropriate and robust statisti-
cal  methods in cognitive neuroscience (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009;  Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). Bearing these in mind, the
present  review will consider the robustness of the reported
results in each paper, in addition to the headline claims.
Methodological factors such as the number of participants,
the stimulus design and possible ﬁle-drawer effects will
also  be considered. The 25 papers identiﬁed for detailed
review are listed in Table 1, grouped by methodology. The
results  of each are summarised in terms of whether the
paper  provides evidence for an abnormal MNS  in ASC, a
normal  MNS  or evidence which is mixed. Mixed evidence
can  mean either that different components of the data sug-
gest  different things, or because the reported results are
not  entirely statistically robust. What follows is a narra-
tive  review of the studies listed in Table 1, describing ﬁrst
the  methods used and how accurately they index MNS
function, and then the patterns of data found in different
studies.
4.  Studies which indirectly measure MNS  function
4.1. EEG studies
A  seminal paper by Muthukumaraswamy et al. (2004)
deﬁned a rhythm emanating from sensorimotor cortex
which seems to change during performed and observed
actions. This mu rhythm is deﬁned as a signal between
8  and 13 Hz recorded from electrodes C3, C4 and Cz. It is
suppressed when participants perform an action, imagine
performing an action or observe an action. Because the mu
rhythm  is suppressed for both performed and observed
action, it has been taken as an index of mirror neuron
function. Recent work combining EEG and fMRI shows
that mu-suppression correlates with BOLD signal in infe-
rior  parietal lobule, dorsal premotor cortex and BA2 in the
sensorimotor strip, but not in BA44 as previously assumed
(Arnstein et al., 2011). BA2 is the strongest generator of the
mu  rhythm (Salmelin and Hari, 1994). The inferior parietal
lobule is part of the MNS, while the dorsal premotor cor-
tex  and BA2 are part of the extended MNS  (Caspers et al.,
2010).  Thus, the link between mu  rhythm and the MNS  is
reasonable, though mu  rhythm is unlikely to provide a pure
assessment of the function of the frontal mirror systems in
BA44.
Six  studies have examined mu  rhythm suppression in
participants with ASC, testing a total of 92 participants (see
94
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Table 1
Summary of studies of autism in this review.
Modality Paper Number of ASC
participants
Mean  participant
age  (years)
Task  Results Summary
EEG
Oberman et al. (2005) 11 16.6 Move hand; watch hand movement
video; watch bouncing balls video;
watch white noise
ASC do not show suppression for hand
observation. Group by condition
interaction not tested
Mixed
Oberman et al. (2008) 13 10 Watch videos of: stranger open/close
hand; familiar person open/close hand;
own hand open/close; bouncing balls
Main effect of familiarity; no familiarity by
group interaction; simple effects in ASC for
familiar only
Mixed
Raymaekers  et al. (2009) 20 11.2 Observe video of moving hand;
bouncing balls; white noise; move own
hand
Sig suppression to hand obs in both groups;
no main effects of group or interactions;
marginal age effects in ASC group
Normal
Martineau et al. (2008) 14 6 (approx.) Observe 20 s video of:
white/lake/waterfall/person doing leg
movements
Hemisphere by group by sequence
interactions in theta1 only; left
hemisphere differences
Abnormal
Fan  et al. (2010) 20  17.7 Observe+; observe hand manipulating
object; observe moving white dot;
perform hand manipulation on object
No main effect of group; no group by
condition interactions; no correlations
with age; correlation between mu  and
ADI-communication
Normal
Bernier  et al. (2007) 14 23 Rest/observe/execute/imitate of hand
grasping block
No  group by task interaction; but
ASC-observe differs in simple effects; some
correlations between mu and imitation
performance
Mixed
MEG
Avikainen et al. (1999) 5 25 Observe live object manipulation No group differences Normal
Honaga et al. (2010) 7 26 Observe live hand action for later
execution, then execute actions. All
object-directed familiar actions
No differences in sensorimotor cortex or
visual cortex; group diffs in left
sensorimotor; right premotor; ACC; right
STS
Mixed
Nishitani  et al. (2004) 8 29.9 Imitate lip movements Difference in timing of inferior frontal
component
Abnormal
TMS
Enticott et al. (2012) 34 26 Observe video of static hand; hand
grasp mug; pantomime grasp
Main effect: smaller MEPs to transitive
actions in ASC group
Abnormal
Théoret et al. (2005) 10 39 Observe index ﬁnger or thumb
movements
Main effect of group. ASC show normal
MEPS for allocentric actions but no MEP
change for egocentric actions
Mixed
EMG
Cattaneo et al. (2007) 8 6.5 Mouth muscle activity,
doing/observing grasping
Group by time interaction for observation;
delayed response in ASC in performance
Abnormal
Pascolo and Cattarinussi (2012) 7 7.7 Replicate cattaneo; record mouth
muscle EMG  when child grasps to eat
No anticipation in TD or ASC kids. No group
differences; delay differs with food
location and child arm length
Normal
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Table 1 (Continued)
Modality Paper Number of ASC
participants
Mean  participant
age  (years)
Task  Results Summary
Eyetracking
Falck-Ytter (2009) 18 5y10m Observe person placing items in box TD and ASC both show predictive gaze; no
group differences
Normal
Falck-Ytter  et al. (2012) 40 5y10m Observe actor who makes eye contact,
then gazes or points at objects
TD look to indicated item more; ASC look
less and slower; ASC performance
correlates  with Vineland communication
Normal
Vivanti et al. (2011) 18 13 (1) Observe rational/irrational actions;
(2) observe action sequences; (3)
observe actress sorting objects, need to
attend to emotions; (4) imitate actions
after direct/averted gaze
(1) Both groups look to face in irrational;
(2) ASC look less at face; ASC predict action
based on sequence but not based on head
turn; (3) no group differences; (4) both
groups look more to direct gaze face; TD do
better in direct gaze
Normal
Vivanti et al. (2008) 18 11y4m Watch 6 meaningful/6 meaningless
actions to imitate
ASC  participants look less to the face and
imitate less accurately. Both groups look
more to meaningful than meaningless
actions, with no group differences and no
group by task interaction
Normal
fMRI
Bastiaansen et al. (2011) 21 30 Observe disgust face/move face/taste
disgust; ROI in RBA44 based on
Dapretto, contrast obs face > rest
No main effects of group or emotion,
activity in BA44 ROI interacts with age
(low for young ASC)
Mixed
Dapretto et al. (2006) 10 12 Observe/imitate emotional facial
expressions
Right pars opercularis shows less activity
in ASC; left aIPS more activity in ASC
Abnormal
Dinstein et al. (2010) 13 27.4 Observe/perform hand actions; RS
analysis
Normal responses and normal adaptation
in aIPS; ASC more variable
Normal
Grèzes et al. (2009) 12 26 Observe static/dynamic people
walking through door with
neutral/fearful posture
Dynamic > static: both groups engage
premotor,  IPS and STS; fear > neutral: TD
only engage rIFG, premotor and amygdala;
DCM suggests differences driven by
amygdala
Normal
Marsh  and Hamilton (2011) 18 33 Observation of rational and irrational
actions
No differences in left or right aIPS; group
differences in SMA/MCC; group by
rationality interaction in mPFC
Normal
Martineau et al. (2010) 7 23 Observe video of 1 Hz hand
ﬂexion/extension v static hand;
execute 1 Hz hand ﬂexion/extension v.
static  hand
(Observation > rest) by group interaction:
bilateral  IFG is MORE active in ASC
Abnormal
Schulte-Rüther et al. (2011) 14 27 Observe happy/sad/neutral faces.
Other task: “decide how he/she feels”.
Self task: “decide how you feel”
No group differences in IFG, both groups
robustly engage left IFG during the SELF
task
Normal
Williams et al. (2006) 16 15;4 Imitate ﬁnger lifting; symbolic cue;
spatial cue
Groups  similar for imitation; differences in
fusiform/middle occipital/IPL; no BA44
effects in either group
Mixed
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Table 1). All but one of these studies focus on the classic
mu  rhythm recorded at 8–13 Hz over C3, C4 and Cz, and all
employ  similar experimental designs based on Oberman
et  al. (2005). This means that comparisons across stud-
ies  are relevantly easy. The basis of the design is that in
different blocks of trials, participants perform hand move-
ments;  watch a video of hand movements; watch a video
of  a bouncing ball or watch a baseline video of white noise.
Mu  suppression is indexed by the difference in mu-rhythm
power between observation of hand actions and baseline.
Ideally, this should be revealed in a group by condition
interaction, where participants with ASC show suppres-
sion in the performed action condition but not in the action
observation condition. Of the ﬁve studies, none report this
conclusive interaction. However, three studies testing 38
participants report a lack of suppression when participants
with ASC observe actions, as indexed by simple effects
(Bernier et al., 2007; Oberman et al., 2005, 2008). The lack
of  a reported group by condition interaction in these papers
unfortunately makes it very hard to properly interpret the
data  (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). A further two studies test-
ing  40 participants found no differences in mu  suppression
in  ASC and no group by condition interaction (Fan et al.,
2010;  Raymaekers et al., 2009). Finally, one study reported
differences between typical and ASC participants in the
3–5.5  Hz range when observing leg movements (Martineau
et  al., 2008). Overall, these studies do not present clear evi-
dence  for abnormal mu  rhythm suppression in individuals
with ASC when observing human actions.
4.2. MEG  studies
Three  studies have examined MEG  signals during action
observation or imitation in ASC. Two examined the rebound
in  the beta rhythm (15–25 Hz) after median nerve stimu-
lation during the observation of action. The relationship of
this  signal to the functioning of the mirror system is not
known, but it is possible that it is similar to the mu rhythm
(Salmelin and Hari, 1994). That is, the signal originates in
the  sensorimotor cortex and largely reﬂects the activation
of  these regions but is not a pure index of mirror system
function. When beta rhythm rebound in typical and ASC
adults  was compared, group differences were found in one
case  (Honaga et al., 2010) but not another (Avikainen et al.,
1999).  Thus, there is no consistent evidence for differences
here. The ﬁnal study reported subtle differences in the tim-
ing  of MEG  components during a task requiring imitation of
facial  postures (Nishitani et al., 2004), with particular dif-
ferences  in IFG. This result suggests only small differences
in MNS  function. All these MEG  studies have used very
small sample sizes (5–8 participants) and none showed a
conclusive task by group interaction, so the results must all
be  treated with caution.
4.3.  TMS  studies
Transcranial magnetic stimulation over human pri-
mary motor cortex results in a motor evoked potential
(MEP) which can be recorded from muscles in the hand.
Several studies have shown that the size of this MEP  reﬂects
the  underlying excitability of primary motor cortex, andive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105
that  cortical excitability can be modulated by a number of
factors  including prior TMS  (Fitzgerald et al., 2006), med-
ications (Ziemann, 2004), and motor or cognitive tasks
(Rothwell et al., 1991). Of particular relevance here is the
ﬁnding  that MEP  size is enhanced when typical participants
observe an action compared to a control task (Fadiga et al.,
1995;  Strafella and Paus, 2001). This is often taken as an
index  of the function of mirror neuron system though like
the  mu  rhythm it is a weakly localised measure.
Two studies have measured the excitability of primary
motor cortex during the observation of action in adults with
ASC  (Enticott et al., 2012; Théoret et al., 2005). In both
studies, motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded
from ﬁrst dorsal interosseous (an index ﬁnger muscle)
while participants observed hand actions. Theoret and
colleagues reported that participants with ASC showed
normal MEP  enhancement when observing a hand oriented
as  if it belonged to someone else, but did not show MEP
enhancement when the hand was oriented as if it belong
to  the participant. Enticott and colleagues reported that
typical  participants showed an MEP  enhancement when
watching a hand grasp a mug  compared to watching a
static  hand, while participants with ASC did not show this
enhancement. Thus, these studies both suggest abnormal
excitability of primary motor cortex during action obser-
vation  in ASC, which might indicate MNS  abnormality.
4.4. Eyetracking studies
Recordings  of eye movements while participants watch
videos of human actions provide a rapid and implicit mea-
sure  of a participant’s interest in and understanding of the
video.  Typical adults show a distinctive pattern of pre-
dictive eye gaze when they perform hand actions, that
is,  the participant’s eyes land on the target object around
200  ms  before the participant’s hand reaches that object.
This  same pattern of predictive gaze is recorded when par-
ticipants  observe human hand actions, but not when they
observe  actions with no hand (Flanagan and Johansson,
2003). The matching of predictive eye movements between
performed and observed hand actions has been taken as a
measure  of mirror system function. The close development
of predictive gaze for performed and observed actions in
infants  (Rosander and von Hofsten, 2011) and the modu-
lation  of predictive gaze by the state of the motor system
(Ambrosini et al., 2012) supports this claim.
Four studies have recorded gaze behaviour when indi-
viduals with ASC observe different hand actions. First,
Falck-Ytter studied predictive gaze in a paradigm equiva-
lent  to Flanagan and Johansson, and found that both typical
and  autistic children showed the same pattern of predic-
tive  gaze (Falck-Ytter, 2009). In a second study, children
watched videos where an actor makes eye contact with
the  camera and then looks or points to a particular object
(Falck-Ytter et al., 2012). Participants with ASC looked to
the  indicated item less, showing that eye tracking meas-
ures  are sensitive to differences in social gaze following in
ASC.  Third, Vivanti and colleagues recorded how children
with ASC watched videos of meaningful and meaningless
actions prior to imitating those actions (Vivanti et al., 2008).
They  found that participants with ASC spent slightly less
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ime looking at the actor’s face and showed worse imitation
erformance. Both typical and ASC participants showed the
ame  pattern of looking more at the face during the mean-
ngless action trials, and there were no group differences in
he  time spent looking at the hands. Finally, the same group
tudied  how typical and autistic children respond when
atching a variety of videos of action sequences. The pat-
ern  of results suggest that children with ASC sometimes
ooked less to the face of the actor, but showed the same
egree of action prediction based on the sequence of hand
ctions  or the rationality of the action (Vivanti et al., 2011).
Comparing across these studies is not straightforward,
s all four involved different stimuli and methodologies.
owever, none of the studies provide evidence for dif-
erences in how participants with autism observe hand
ctions. Group differences only emerge when considering
bservation of the face or of social cues. While the contri-
ution of the mirror system to eye gaze behaviour is not yet
lear,  it is much more likely to drive gaze towards the acting
and  rather than to faces and other social cues. Thus, nor-
al  gaze towards hand actions in autism, and in particular
ormal predictive gaze, implies that the mirror systems
upporting observation of other people’s actions are also
ormal.
.5.  EMG  studies
By  studying the level and timing of muscle activation
uring motor tasks, it is possible to make inferences about
he  information processing underlying the action. Many
tudies of motor performance in participants with ASC
ave  found evidence of difﬁculties in this domain (Fournier
t  al., 2010). The present review focuses only on studies
hich make claims about the ability of children with ASC
o  understand or respond to other people’s actions, focus-
ng  on mirror systems. Most of these studies are based on
he  idea that some mirror neurons encode simple action
equences or chains (Fogassi et al., 2005), for example, pick-
ng  up an object and then moving it to one’s mouth. When
ypical individuals perform or observe such sequences,
inematic or EEG components which are required for the
nal  action in the sequence are sometimes seen at an earlier
tage,  anticipating the ﬁnal action and reﬂecting the idea
hat  the different elements in a motor sequence are closely
hained together (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2010). Two
tudies  have attempted to measure this action chaining in
ndividuals  with ASC using EMG  methods.
Cattaneo et al. (2007) recorded EMG  from the mylo-
yoid muscle which opens the mouth while typical and
utistic children picked up a small piece of food to eat or
lace  upon their shoulder, or while they watched another
erson perform the same task. This action involves three
omponents – reaching the food, grasping the food, and
lacing the food either in the mouth or on the shoulder.
hey report that typical, but not autistic, children activate
he  MH  muscle during the grasping phase when performing
he  action, showing anticipation of the reaching phase. Fur-
hermore,  the typical children showed MH  activity when
atching someone else grasp whereas the autistic children
id  not. Similar results were reported with a task involving
lacing items in a pedal bin. Cattaneo and colleagues argueive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105 97
that  the anticipatory activity of the MH  muscle during per-
formance and observation of action provides a measure
of  the functioning of ‘action chains’ in the parietal mirror
system, and that the abnormal activity of this muscle in
children  with ASC must reﬂect abnormal mirror systems.
However, a recent paper which attempted to replicate this
result  (Pascolo and Cattarinussi, 2012) found that neither
typical nor ASC children showed anticipatory MH  activity
during performed actions. The authors suggested that dif-
ferences  in the lengths of children’s arms and the distance
they have to reach might impact on MH  engagement in
this  task. Overall, these studies provide mixed evidence for
difﬁculties  in action chaining in children with ASC.
5.  fMRI studies of the MNS  in autism
The studies reviewed above all use weakly localised
measures to examine the possible function of the mirror
neuron system in individuals with ASC, which makes it hard
to  know if the results reﬂect only the function of the MNS
or  are inﬂuenced by other processes. The cleanest measure
of  MNS  function is functional magnetic resonance imaging,
because this method provides clearly localised activations
within or outside the human MNS  regions. The responses
of  inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal lobule
(IPL)  are particularly important here. Eight studies have
now  examined the MNS  in individuals with ASC using fMRI,
and  the results are reviewed here.
The ﬁrst study to show MNS  differences in ASC using
fMRI examined children who  were asked to observe
or imitate emotional facial expressions during scanning
(Dapretto et al., 2006). Right IFG showed stronger engage-
ment  in the typical children than in the autistic children
during imitation of emotional facial expressions, while left
anterior  intraparietal sulcus showed the reverse pattern.
Three studies since have examined mirroring responses
to  emotional stimuli in ASC. Grèzes et al. (2009) showed
adults with ASC and typical adults movie of whole body
actions displaying neutral or fearful behaviour. Both typ-
ical  and autistic participants engaged mirror systems in
response  to the neutral stimuli, but the typical partic-
ipants showed more activation of inferior frontal gyrus
and  amygdala in response to the fearful stimuli. The
authors conclude that different responses to observation
of emotional actions in autism are driven by differences
in emotion processing in the amygdala, not by core differ-
ences  in the mirror system.
A second study of emotion mirroring examined brain
responses when participants observe a disgust expression
or  taste a disgusting taste (Bastiaansen et al., 2011); ante-
rior  insula responds in these conditions in typical adults
(Wicker et al., 2003). In the participants with ASC, sim-
ilar  responses were seen at the whole group level with
no  systematic group differences. Using a region of interest
analysis, Bastiaansen did ﬁnd age-related changes in the
engagement of right IFG across groups, with lower acti-
vation in the youngest participants with autism but no
differences in older participants. They conclude that devel-
opment  of MNS  function continues over the 18–55 years
age  range examined in their sample, and that improvement
in MNS  function in adulthood remains possible. Finally, a
l Cognit98 A.F.d.C. Hamilton / Developmenta
study by Schulte-Rüther et al. (2011) examined how typ-
ical  and autistic participants respond to happy and sad
facial  expressions when asked to “decide how this per-
son  feels” or to “decide how you feel when you look at
the  face”. Group differences emerged in brain regions asso-
ciated  with theory of mind (mPFC and TPJ) but not in
the  inferior frontal cortex. In particular, both typical and
autistic  participants engaged left hemisphere IFG when
instructed to attend to their own emotions, and the authors
conclude that participants with ASC can engage their MNS
when  the task demands it. Together, these four studies of
mirroring  of emotional facial expressions in ASC provide
a  mixed picture, with only one study suggesting a clear
deﬁcit (Dapretto et al., 2006) while the other three show
normal responses under neutral or instructed task condi-
tions  (Grèzes et al., 2009; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011) or
in  some age groups (Bastiaansen et al., 2011). However,
interpretation of all these studies is complicated by the use
of  emotional stimuli which almost certainly engage other
brain  systems beyond the MNS  and cannot provide a pure
index  of MNS  function.
Four  studies have examined the integrity of the MNS  in
ASC  using non-emotional tasks. Williams et al. (2006) used
a  simple ﬁnger movement imitation task in which partici-
pants  observe, execute or imitate index ﬁnger movements
to  examine mirror systems in typical and autistic adults.
This  task was previously shown to engage IFG in typical
adults (Iacoboni et al., 1999). The results from Williams
et al. are hard to interpret because, unlike Iacoboni et al.,
they  did not ﬁnd engagement of IFG in either typical or
autistic  participants. Subtle differences were found in the
responsiveness of occipital regions and part of parietal lob-
ule,  which the authors attribute to an abnormality of the
parietal  MNS. Martineau and colleagues examined obser-
vation  of action in ASC (Martineau et al., 2010) and found a
group  by condition interaction, with more activation of the
IFG  in participants with ASC than in those without. Both
groups  of participants engaged parietal cortex though the
precise  regions activated differed slightly. Though these
results  are not exactly as predicted by the broken mir-
ror  hypothesis, the authors interpret them as evidence of
atypical  MNS  engagement in ASC.
Dinstein et al. examined brain responses when partic-
ipants with ASC observed still images of hand postures
or executed those postures (Dinstein et al., 2010). Stimuli
were  presented in a systematic order to allow the mea-
surement of neural selectivity by repetition suppression.
This is based on the ﬁnding that when the same stim-
ulus is presented twice in a row, BOLD responses are
smaller on the second presentation, and this suppressed
response indicates that populations of neurons are sensi-
tive  to the speciﬁc stimulus characteristics (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006; Hamilton and Grafton, 2007). Dinstein and
colleagues found that typical and autistic participants
showed equivalent BOLD responses and equivalent pat-
terns  of repetition suppression across visual and motor
brain regions include the aIPS component of the MNS.
Marsh and Hamilton (2011) performed a similar study,
recording brain responses while typical and autistic adults
viewed  videos of rational and irrational goal-directed hand
actions.  They found that both groups engaged aIPS whenive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105
watching actions and showed repetition suppression in this
region  when the goal of the action was repeated. Differ-
ences between the groups emerged in middle cingulate
cortex when observing actions and in medial prefrontal
cortex when observing irrational actions. However, there
was  no evidence in either of these studies for abnormal
MNS  function in participants with ASC.
Together, these fMRI studies provide little evidence to
support  a speciﬁc and universal impairment of the MNS
in  ASC. Three studies report group differences in inferior
frontal gyrus, and one found an increase in activation in ASC
(Martineau et al., 2010) while the other found a decrease
(Dapretto et al., 2006) and a third found age-related effects
(Bastiaansen et al., 2011). Normal IFG responses were
reported by two  studies (Grèzes et al., 2009; Schulte-Rüther
et al., 2011). Responses in the aIPS component of the MNS
were  entirely normal in the two studies which exam-
ined this region in detail (Dinstein et al., 2010; Marsh and
Hamilton, 2011).
Finally,  it is worth examining meta-analyses of engage-
ment of the autistic brain in a broader range of tasks. If
failure  of the MNS  is a cause of all social-cognitive dif-
ﬁculties in autism, this should be apparent in a variety
of social contexts. A meta-analysis of autism fMRI stud-
ies  (Di Martino et al., 2009) found consistent differences in
medial  prefrontal cortex in social tasks but not in any mir-
ror  neuron regions. A more recent and larger meta-analysis
(Philip et al., 2012) similarly did not report any overall
abnormality of MNS  regions, in fact, right IFG was more
active during complex social tasks in participants with ASC.
Thus,  fMRI meta-analyses also argue against the broken
mirror model.
5.1.  Structural MRI
If  abnormality of the MNS  is a core feature of ASC, one
might expect to see structural abnormalities of the IFG
and  IPL, in particular when cortical thickness and struc-
ture  is examined in detail. It is beyond the scope of the
present review to examine all structural MRI  studies of
ASC  in detail. Two papers report speciﬁc differences in
mirror  system regions in ASC. Yamasaki and colleagues
manually traced the pars opercularis region in the struc-
tural  MRI  scans of participants with ASC (Yamasaki et al.,
2010).  They reported that the volume of right pars opercu-
laris  was reduced in ASC and that the size of this region
correlated with the participants social and communica-
tion abilities. This suggests that MNS  structure is related to
social  skills. Hadjikhani and colleagues examines cortical
thickness across the whole brain (Hadjikhani et al., 2006)
and  found thinning in a number of areas in the ASC brain.
These  included the IFG, IPL and STS, as well as pre and post-
central  gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus, orbitofrontal cortex,
prefrontal cortex, middle and inferior temporal gyrus, and
superior  parietal lobule. These regions include important
components of the MNS, but also many other brain regions
which  contribute to other forms of social cognition.Contrasting with these two  small studies, a voxel-
based morphometry study of 65 adults with ASC revealed
differences in medial temporal, fusiform and cerebellar
regions but not IFG or IPL (Toal et al., 2010). Focusing on
A.F.d.C. Hamilton / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105 99
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fig. 1. Diagram of brain regions mentioned in text. The core human mirr
ensitive  to goal-directed actions. Measurements of mu rhythm are mos
ensitive  to the excitability of primary motor cortex.
ortical thickness, Ecker and colleagues examined struc-
ural  MRIs to determine what parameters and brain regions
est  distinguish autistic from typical brains (Ecker et al.,
010).  They were able to develop a robust classiﬁcation
lgorithm which drew on data from much of the cortical
urface, with no particular contribution of MNS  regions. A
eview  of brain structure in ASC from 2003 identiﬁed dif-
erences  in parieto-temporal cortex and cerebellum but not
PL  or IFG (Brambilla et al., 2003). Similarly, a formal meta-
nalysis of grey and white matter differences reported in 22
tudies  found consistent group differences in medial pre-
rontal  cortex, fusiform cortex, cingulate and insula but not
n  either IFG or IPL (Duerden et al., 2012). Together, these
tudies suggest that there are many subtle structural dif-
erences in the ASC brain, but changes in the MNS  regions
f  IPL and IFG are certainly not the most prominent.
. Discussion
The papers reviewed above reﬂect current knowledge
f the integrity and function of the mirror neuron system in
ndividuals  with autism. Over the 25 studies reviewed, evi-
ence  in favour of a dysfunction of the MNS  in autism is very
imited.  To explore the implications of these results, I ﬁrst
ummarise the ﬁndings from weakly localised measures
f  MNS  function (EEG/MEG/TMS/EMG/eyetracking) sepa-
ately  from more localised measures (fMRI/structural MRI).
 then focus on what this means for the broken mirror the-
ry  (BMT) and consider possible alternative explanations
or reduced imitation and abnormal social skills in ASC.The  weakly localised studies of MNS  function in ASC
ielded mixed results. Two TMS  studies consistently sug-
ested  abnormal primary motor cortex excitability, while
our  eyetracking studies revealed normal behaviour. Of then system comprises IFG and IPL, including the aIPS which is particularly
ve to activation of BA2 (somatosensory cortex) while TMS  measures are
eight  EEG studies, only one reported a reliable group by task
interaction and in the remainder evidence for abnormal
MNS  responses was weak or clearly absent. The three MEG
and  two EMG  studies also showed mixed effects. Over-
all,  this is a very variable dataset with no clear evidence
favouring the BMT.
A  major limitation of all these neurophysiological meas-
ures  is that they do not provide precise localisation of the
origin  of the effects in the brain. This means that they
do  not provide a pure index of MNS  function. The sup-
pression of the mu rhythm in EEG correlates best with
activation of the sensorimotor strip (Arnstein et al., 2011)
not  inferior frontal gyrus, and MEG  measures are likely to
be  similar. TMS  studies reveal the excitability of primary
motor cortex but not the engagement of the MNS  itself (see
Fig.  1 for a summary of the relevant brain regions). Several
recent studies have shown that activity in the sensor-
imotor cortex is modulated by social factors other than
action observation. Cortical rhythms at 7–12 Hz recorded
with MEG  (similar to the mu  rhythm) are modulated by
whether the actor looks at the participant or not, rather
than by which arm he moves (Kilner et al., 2006). Similarly,
MEP  size recorded from primary motor cortex after TMS
is  larger when participants have just engaged in a social
interaction than when they have not (Hogeveen and Obhi,
2012).  These studies show that the broader social con-
text  has a substantial impact on the results obtained using
weakly  localised measures of ‘mirror neuron function’. It
is  very hard to equate factors such as level of social inter-
action and the amount of eye contact between typical and
ASC  participants, which means that differences between
typical and ASC groups in studies using weakly localised
measures could be due to extraneous factors, and might
not  reﬂect only the integrity of the MNS. Unless the impact
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of these top-down factors on the MNS  can be ruled out
(Southgate and Hamilton, 2008), weakly localised meas-
ures  cannot provide clear evidence for an abnormal MNS
in  ASC.
fMRI studies directly measure the BOLD signal in MNS
regions of the brain during cognitive tasks, and thus pro-
vide  a much clearer test of the broken mirror theory. The
eight  studies reviewed provide a clear pattern. Four studies
using  emotional stimuli suggest at least some differences
between typical and ASC participants, while three of the
four  studies using non-emotional stimuli did not ﬁnd clear
group  differences (and the fourth found differences in the
non-predicted direction). These results suggest possible
differences in how individuals with ASC process emotional
stimuli but not in how they process neutral action stimuli.
Two  studies which examined the responses of the autistic
MNS  to observation and performance of symbolic and
goal-directed hand actions reported no differences (Din-
stein  et al.; Marsh and Hamilton). Similarly, structural MRI
studies  show that subtle differences between typical and
autistic  brains in structure and connectivity seem to be
widely  distributed and are not speciﬁc to the MNS. Thus,
the  present review does not provide any reason to believe
that  dysfunction of the MNS  is a primary or universal
problem in ASC.
6.1.  Evaluating the broken mirror theory
These conclusions have important implications for the
broken  mirror theory. As described above, there are three
slightly  different versions of the BMT, so I consider each in
turn.  First, the imitation version of the BMT  claimed that
abnormal self-other mapping implemented in the mirror
system is a core difﬁculty in ASC (Williams et al., 2001;
Gallese et al., 2009). The data reviewed above provide no
reason  to support this theory. Behavioural evidence is also
inconsistent, as the BMT  predicts poor imitation and action
understanding in ASC. Several studies report good imita-
tion  and understanding of action goals in young children
with ASC (Aldridge et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001;
Hamilton et al., 2007) and in adults (Bird et al., 2007). This
adds  to the evidence that the classic, non-emotional MNS
is  not broken in autism, and suggests that it is time to move
on  from this theory.
The  simulation version of the BMT  is broader, encom-
passing both the classic MNS  for hand actions and the
broader MNS  for emotional responses and claiming that
dysfunction of a simulation mechanism in all these sys-
tems  is present in autism (Dapretto and Iacoboni, 2006;
Oberman et al., 2005). The studies reviewed above pro-
vide  little or no evidence for abnormalities of the classic
MNS  in autism. There is some data suggesting abnormal
responses to emotional stimuli, in particular in the fMRI
studies (Dapretto et al., 2006; Grèzes et al., 2009) and this
could  be used to support the simulation BMT. However, a
simulation-BMT which focuses only on emotional actions
and  does not account for good performance and normal
brain activity in non-emotional tasks, loses much of its
explanatory power. It cannot appeal to a general principle
of  simulation because that should apply to both emo-
tional and non-emotional tasks. It then becomes hard toive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105
distinguish  an emotion-simulation-BMT from other the-
ories  of autism that focus on emotion processing, for
example the amygdala theory (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000).
These  factors all mean that a simulation-BMT theory seems
unlikely  to provide a fundamental explanation of social
cognition in autism.
Finally,  the chaining version of the BMT  is based on
the  ﬁnding of mirror neurons which respond to action
sequences (Fogassi et al., 2005), and suggests that the com-
prehension and production of action sequences is abnormal
in  ASC (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2010). This is the only
version  of the BMT  which is unaffected by data showing
that imitation of simple goal-directed actions (Hamilton
et  al., 2007) and brain responses to observation of goal-
directed actions (Dinstein et al., 2010; Marsh and Hamilton,
2011) are entirely normal. The chaining BMT  claims that
these  simple actions do not require chaining, whereas
production and comprehension of more complex action
sequences does require chaining and is abnormal in ASC.
There  are very few tests of this theory so far. Of  all the
studies reviewed above, only the two using EMG  recor-
dings directly address the chaining BMT, and those report
contradictory results.
Evidence  relevant to the chaining theory can also be
found in studies of motor control and action understand-
ing. Individuals with autism often have comorbid dyspraxia
or  other motor control difﬁculties (Fournier et al., 2010;
Gowen and Hamilton, 2012), and these could be accounted
for  by difﬁculties in action chaining. Behavioural studies
suggest that children with ASC ﬁnd it hard to predict the
next  element in an action sequence. In these studies, the
child  sees a picture of an action and is asked ‘why is she
doing  it’ or ‘what is she doing?’. Autistic individuals made
more  errors on the ‘why’ questions than the ‘what’ ques-
tions  (Boria et al., 2009) in contrast to individuals with
Williams syndrome (Sparaci et al., 2012). It is claimed that
understanding why  an action is performed requires motor
chaining abilities, and that failure to answer the ‘why’
question reﬂects a failure of action chaining in the MNS.
However, these behavioural studies do not provide any
way  to localise the source of children’s poor performance
within the MNS  (rather than another brain system). Studies
of  typical adults answering ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions dur-
ing  fMRI show that ‘why’ questions about actions engage
mentalising brain regions, not the MNS  (Spunt et al., 2010,
2011).  This means that children with ASC might give incor-
rect  answers to the ‘why’ questions because of poor men-
talising abilities, not abnormal action chaining abilities.
Overall, these studies provide equivocal evidence about
the  action chaining theory. The ideal test of the theory
would be to have typical and autistic participants perform
and  observe action sequencing tasks during fMRI scanning.
The  chaining theory predicts reduced activation of pari-
etal  cortex in the participants with autism during this task.
Such  an experiment has yet to be performed. Even with the
current  data, there are reasons to be cautious about the
action  chaining theory. In particular, it is not clear how
a  speciﬁc difﬁculty in action sequencing could cause the
problems with theory of mind which seems to best char-
acterise ASC (Frith, 2012). Further work is necessary to
test  the action chaining theory and to understand the link
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Fig. 2. The social top-down response modulation (STORM) model. In this
model, responses in the MNS  to are subject to top-down control based on
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en  evaluation of the current context and social situation. Failure of these
op-down control signals could lead to abnormal imitation and abnormal
NS brain responses in autism.
etween chaining and other types of social cognition if this
heory  is to be accepted.
.2.  Social response modulation: an alternative
xplanation
If researchers are to reject the broken mirror the-
ry, it is essential to consider alternative explanations for
resent  data. Many studies have reported reduced imita-
ion  frequency (Charman et al., 1997; Ingersoll, 2007) and
educed  imitation accuracy (Rogers et al., 1996; Vivanti
t  al., 2008) in participants with ASC (reviewed in Williams
t  al., 2004). However, unusual imitation in the form of
cholalia and echopraxia is also common in ASC (Grossi
t  al., 2012). A number of studies have also reported good
mitation performance (Aldridge et al., 2000; Bird et al.,
007;  Carpenter et al., 2001; Hamilton et al., 2007). Simi-
arly,  the neurophysiological studies reviewed above report
ixed  results, with abnormal brain responses when view-
ng  emotional stimuli (Dapretto et al., 2006; Grèzes et al.,
009)  but normal responses when viewing goal-directed
ctions (Dinstein et al., 2010; Grèzes et al., 2009; Marsh
nd  Hamilton, 2011) (Fig. 2).
This pattern of mixed results is not easy to recon-
ile with a standard broken mirror model. However, it
s  consistent with the social top-down response modu-
ation (STORM) model (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008;
ang and Hamilton, 2012). This model has two  core
omponents, a basic visual-to-motor mapping and a top-
own  modulation system. The visuomotor mapping is
mplemented in a pathway of connections running from
igher-order visual systems through inferior parietal cor-
ex  to premotor cortex and then on to motor cortex. In
ocial  psychology, this transformation has been termed the
erception-behaviour expressway (Dijksterhuis and Bargh,
001),  while in motor control it is described in terms of
ction  speciﬁcation processes (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
ithin this visuomotor stream, the implementation of
mitation responses (or other action responses) is highly
ependent on past experience, that is, on learnt associa-
ions between visual representations of observed actions
nd  motor representations of performed actions (Heyes,
010). Such transformations can occur relatively fast and
asily,  in particular for familiar and practiced actions.ive Neuroscience 3 (2013) 91– 105 101
However, the implementation of imitation responses
by this system is not inevitable, but is controlled by the
demands of the social situation. There are numerous stud-
ies  showing that imitation responses in typical adults are
modulated by social cues. Imitation is enhanced by eye
contact (Wang et al., 2010) and when interacting with indi-
viduals  with high social status or those from an in-group
(Lakin and Chartrand, 2003). In terms of neuroanatomy,
the visuomotor stream is modulated by action selection
processes originating elsewhere. Social signals from mPFC
have  been shown to modulate the MNS  in social con-
texts (Wang et al., 2011), but it is possible that top-down
modulation could also come from other parts of frontal
cortex or from subcortical areas. In this way, STORM par-
allels  the speciﬁcation – selection model proposed for
non-social control of movement (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010)
and  echoes older models of supervisory-attention systems
(Norman and Shallice, 1986). The key difference is that
STORM focuses particularly on modulation of the visuo-
motor stream by social cues and social signals.
There is initial evidence that modulation of imita-
tion by social cues is abnormal in ASC. Participants with
ASC  can imitate actions that produce clear effects on
objects (Ingersoll et al., 2003) but imitate less in contexts
where imitation is spontaneous (rather than instructed)
(Ingersoll, 2007). Whereas typical participants imitate
more after priming with prosocial sentences, adults with
ASC  do not show any change in their mimicry behaviour
(Cook and Bird, 2012). This demonstrates failure to modu-
late  mimicry in the presence of normal mimicry responses
in  ASC. Children with autism similarly show normal auto-
matic  imitation but no enhancement of imitation following
emotional cues (Grecucci et al., 2012). Finally, an inter-
esting study from Spengler and colleagues shows that
engagement of mPFC in a mentalising task in participants
with ASC is correlated with these participants’ imitation
performance (Spengler et al., 2010). This suggests that the-
ory  of mind abilities are linked to the control of imitation,
which is important because difﬁculties in theory of mind
are  well established in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Senju  et al., 2009). Data from these initial studies are com-
patible  with the STORM hypothesis.
The STORM model is also compatible with the results
reviewed above. Abnormal engagement of the autistic
MNS  during emotional tasks (Dapretto et al., 2006; Grèzes
et  al., 2009) can be accounted for by the failure of
social/emotional cues to modulate the MNS. Similar fail-
ure  of top-down emotional modulation in autism has
been  reported for face processing (Bird et al., 2006). Dif-
ferences in TMS  and EEG responses in participants with
autism (Enticott et al., 2012; Oberman et al., 2005) can be
accounted for by between group differences in the sensi-
tivity  to social cues before and during the experimental
session (Hogeveen and Obhi, 2012; Kilner et al., 2006).
Reports of similar responses in typical and ASC participants
are also coherent with the STORM model. In controlled
situations where social cues are minimised, similar MNS
responses are predicted in both typical and ASC partici-
pants as seen (Dinstein et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2010; Marsh
and  Hamilton, 2011). The ﬁndings that participants with
ASC  do show mu-suppression when observing familiar but
l Cognit102 A.F.d.C. Hamilton / Developmenta
not unfamiliar people (Oberman et al., 2008) can also be
accounted for if we assume that people with ASC require
stronger social engagement cues that typical individuals,
but are not entirely immune to social signals. The only
data  which the STORM model does not account for are
the  results suggesting abnormal motor chaining in ASC
(Cattaneo et al., 2007). These data may  be better under-
stood in terms of the comorbid dyspraxia which is common
in  ASC (Fournier et al., 2010) but which may  be independent
of  difﬁculties in social cognition.
Thus,  the STORM model is able to give an account of
most current data on imitation behaviour and the func-
tioning of the MNS  in ASC. Further work is needed to test
the  theory in more detail. In particular, it is important
to determine if individuals with autism fail to modulate
imitation because they are not able to pick-up the rele-
vant  social cues such as eye contact, or if they fail because
they do not implement the appropriate top-down con-
trol.  It is also important to understand how top-down
control of imitation relates to other cognitive domains
such as theory of mind and executive function. STORM
is  congruent with the suggestion that top-down control
in  general is abnormal or weakened in ASC (Cook et al.,
2012;  Frith, 2003) and that weak top-down signals might
lead  to sensory differences in autism (Pellicano and Burr,
2012).  Further study of these areas will yield important
insights into imitation behaviour in ASC, allowing us to
move  beyond mirror neurons in our understanding of the
social  brain.
7.  Conclusions and future directions
The data reviewed above demonstrates that despite
over a decade of research, the broken mirror theory of
autism cannot be supported in its standard form. Inter-
ventions based on this theory are unlikely to be helpful.
Future studies of imitation and social responding in autism
must  take into account both the integrity of the MNS  and
the  role of top-down control signals which modulate imi-
tation  responses. Understanding the relationship between
action  sequencing and other aspects of social cognition may
also  be valuable. Advances in these areas will lead to a bet-
ter  understanding of what is really different about action
systems in autism, and will thus lead to more productive
interventions to help individuals with autism imitate and
interact  with the social world.
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